Hedge fund seeding via fees-for-seed swaps under idiosyncratic risk by Ewald, Christian-Oliver & Zhang, Hai
Ewald, Christian-Oliver and Zhang, Hai (2016) Hedge fund seeding via 
fees-for-seed swap sunder idiosyncratic risk. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 71. pp. 45-59. ISSN 0165-1889 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2016.07.007
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/60471/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Hedge Fund Seeding via Fees-for-Seed Swaps
under Idiosyncratic Risk
Christian Ewald1 and Hai Zhang2
July 16, 2016
Abstract
We develop a dynamic valuation model of the hedge fund seeding busi-
ness by solving the consumption and portfolio-choice problem for a risk-
averse manager who launches a hedge fund through a seeding vehicle. This
vehicle, i.e. fees-for-seed swap, specifies that a strategic partner (seeder)
provides a critical amount of capital in exchange for participation in the
funds revenue. Our results indicate that the new swap not only solves the
serious problem of widespread financing constraints for new and early-
stage funds (ESFs) managers, but can be highly beneficial to both the
manager and the seeder if structured properly.
G11, G12, G23
1 Introduction
There has been a significant increase in both the number of hedge fund seeders
and the amount of capital available for hedge fund seeding since the aftermath
of 2008’s market upheaval.1 However, there still remains a tremendous shortage
of capital for new and early-stage funds (ESFs). This is mainly because most
capital providers or institutional investors increasingly focus on larger estab-
lished hedge funds whose assets under management (AUM) are usually larger
than 1 billion and who are considered highly credible. Additionally a larger
talent pool of ESFs managers is now competing for the scarce available seed
capital. Worse still, barriers to entry for ESFs are much higher today than in
the period before the 2008 financial crisis.2
Therefore, navigating the terrain to a successful launch of a hedge fund has
become more diﬃcult and the financing constraint faced by ESFs managers
1HFM-Week research reported in November 2011 that seeders had approximately $4.6
billion in available capital, compared to approximately $1 billion just one year earlier.
2The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Title IV) compels
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to impose reporting requirements on all
hedge funds as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the assessment
of systemic risk. According to “Launch bad; Hedge funds” (The Economist 20 Apr. 2013:
79), it is much harder now to break into the hedge-fund business than it used to be because
of the rising expenses, more risk-averse investors and enhanced regulation.
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nowadays is much more serious than before. In order to reach the initial AUM
target and cover organizational expenses, more and more ESFs managers are
likely to turn to seed investors for early stage of capital through a seeding vehicle.
This is an arrangement to which we refer as fees-for-seed swap that specifies that
a seed investor (or seeder) commonly commits to providing a remarkable amount
of seed capital to an ESFs manager as an “anchor investor” in a new fund in
exchange for a share of “enhanced economics” which is usually the fees that the
ESFs manager generates from the entire pool of assets in the fund. If structured
properly, the seeding approach can be highly beneficial to the ESFs manager
and to investors who provide the seed capital. It is not uncommon that the
hedge fund seeder receives a portion of the hedge fund’s revenue stream to get
greater return potential than an ordinary investor.
In general a seeder can expect about 1% of revenues for each $1 million of
seed capital for seed transactions no larger than $50 million. However, seed
arrangements can vary substantially based on factors such as the experience
of the manager, the alpha record, the amount of seed capital provided, the
withdrawal and lock-up period terms, and the relative negotiating power of
each party.3
While the seed investor will often demand the flexibility to redeem her4
investment as soon as possible, the manager needs (and should require) the
seed capital to remain invested for a period suﬃcient to set its strategy, create a
track record, and procure other investors. Generally, during the lock-up period,
the seed investor should be prohibited from redeeming the investment if, in
the reasonable judgment of the manager, doing so could adversely aﬀect the
interests of the other investors in the fund.5
The ordinary investors may withdraw capital if the fund shows poor perfor-
mance. For simplicity , we assume that the withdrawal rate is constant. This is
a common assumption in the hedge fund literature and has been employed
by [Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)] and [Lan, Wang and Yang(2013)].
Also, depending on the terms of the deal, the seeder will generally commit
to keep the investment in the fund for a defined lock-up period, typically two to
four years. It makes sense to assume that during this initial phase, idiosyncratic
risks take a more pronounced role as compared to later stages in the fund’s life,
possibly due to ordinary investors entering (or leaving) the fund and/or the fund
manager experimenting with diﬀerent asset classes in order to set up a successful
strategy. As seed commitments expire, AUM will be divided among the ordi-
nary investors, the seeder, and the ESFs manager according to a ”waterfall”
schedule.6 After the initial seeding stage, the fund becomes more stable and
3Source form Larch Lane Advisors: Hedge Fund Seeding: A Compelling Alternative.
4Rather than using the gender neutral “she/he” and “her/his” we have chosen for simplicity
to simply use the pronouns “she” and “her” throughout the manuscript.
5Infrequently, a seeder may identify certain conditions under which it will be permitted
to redeem investment, prior to the lock-up period, such as in the event of poor fund perfor-
mance, management attrition, sale or transfer of control of the management entity, criminal
convictions or regulatory violations and material breaches of the investment parameters or
provisions of the seed investment agreement.
6See details in the next Section.
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in our idealized setup we assume that the ESFs manager no longer bears any
idiosyncratic risk after the lock-up period has been completed. Therefore, we
can apply Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross’ ([Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)])
model to calculate the market value of the fund at termination of the lock-up
period. While the manager’s performance incentives during the lock-up period
are implemented through a waterfall schedule, performance incentives after the
lock-up period are provided by a high-water-mark (HWM) incentive, compare
[Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)].
As there is no publicly available data on the historical performance of seeding
strategies, there are only very few simple models in practice focusing on hedge
fund seeding return, volatility and liquidity profile.7 To our knowledge, this pa-
per provides the first dynamic framework on valuation of the hedge fund seeding
business by solving the portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse manager.
Several other studies evaluate the performance of hedge funds focusing on dif-
ferent aspects. [Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)] provide the first quan-
titative inter-temporal valuation framework of investors’ payoﬀ and managers’
fees in a setting where the fund’s value follows a log-normal process and the
fund managers have no discretion over the choice of portfolio. [Carpenter(2000)]
shows that it is optimal for hedge fund managers who face no explicit downside
risk to choose infinite volatility as asset value goes to zero. This behavior is re-
ferred to as risk-shifting. [Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro(2007)], [Hodder and Jackwerth (2007)]
and [Aragon and Nanda(2012)] argue though that a manager’s convex payoﬀ
structure does not necessarily induce risk shifting when the fund shows poor per-
formance as long as the manager is exposed to downside risk, either through her
ownership of fund share or through her annual fees. [Panageas and Westerfield(2009)],
and [Lan, Wang and Yang(2013)] analyze the impact of management fees and
high-water mark based incentive fee on leverage and valuation. None of these
studies, however, model the hedge fund seeding innovation in the context of
the ESFs manager’s portfolio choice problem, and hence they do not assess the
costs of illiquidity and unspanned risk of hedge fund seeding investments.
Our article also relates to the literature about valuation and portfolio choice
with illiquid assets, such as restricted stocks, executive compensation, illiquid
entrepreneurial businesses, and private equity (PE) investments. For exam-
ple, [Kahl, Liu and Longstaﬀ(2003)] analyze a continuous-time portfolio choice
model with restricted stocks. Both [Chen, Miao and Wang(2010)] and [Wang, Wang and Yang(2012)]
study entrepreneurial firms with unspanned idiosyncratic risks under incom-
plete markets. For PE investments, [Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014)] develop
a dynamic valuation model of PE investments by solving the portfolio-choice
problem for a risk-averse investor, who invests in a private equity fund, man-
aged by a general partner. We are unaware, though, of any existing models that
capture the illiquidity, managerial skill (alpha), risk attitude and compensation
of the hedge fund seeding business. Capturing these important features in a
model that is suﬃciently tractable to determine the subjective value of fees in
7Larch Lane Advisors LLC constructed a simple model to project returns and cash flows
for a seeded fund featuring an innovative seeding strategy.
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the hedge fund seeding business is one of the main contributions of this study.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic valuation
framework for modeling hedge fund seeding innovation and the impact of in-
centive contracts, managerial stake and hedge fund liquidation on a risk-averse
ESFs manager’s consumption and portfolio-choice behavior. A solution for this
model is derived in Section 3. Section 4 and Section 5 discuss numerical results
for breakeven alphas, seed costs and subjective value of management compensa-
tion. The main conclusions are summarized in Section 6. The appendix provides
detailed computations relating to the market value of the hedge fund after the
initial seeding stage.
2 Model Setup
2.1 Hedge fund seeding investment opportunities
We consider an infinitely-lived risk-averse ESFs manager who has the opportu-
nity to launch a take-it-or-leave-it hedge fund at present time 0, which requires
to raise the target AUM S0. All sources of uncertainty arise from two inde-
pendent standard Brownian motions B and Z defined on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft : t ≥ 0}, P ), where F ≡ {Ft : t ≥ 0} describes the flow of
information available to the seeder.
In addition to the opportunity of launching a fund, the manager has access
to standard financial investment opportunities, see [Merton(1971)]. Let Wt
denote the ESFs manager’s liquid (financial) wealth process. At any time t ≥ 0
the manager invests an amount of Πt in a diversified market portfolio and the
remaining amount Wt−Πt in the risk-free asset with a constant interest rate r.
The return of the diversified market portfolio is denoted by R and satisfies
dRt = µMdt+ σMdBt, (1)
where µM and σM > 0 are constants, and η ≡ (µM − r)/σM is the Sharpe ratio
of the market portfolio.
We assume that AUM of the hedge fund {St : t ≥ 0} follows a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM):
dSt
St
= (µ− ω −m)dt+ ρσdBt +
√
1− ρ2σdZt, S0 ≡ S given, (2)
where µ, ω,m and σ are constants; µ is the expected growth rate, ωS is the
regular withdrawals or distribution among investors, mS is the management fee
continuously occurring at the rate mS8, σ is the total volatility of hedge fund
8Hedge fund managers normally receive 20% of the increase in fund value in excess
of the last recorded maximum, i.e. high-water-mark (henceforth, HWM) as incentive fee
in addition to 2% of AUM as annual fees, a compensation structure often referred to as
two-twenty and considered as the industry standard. Several academic articles study the
characteristics of hedge fund fees, such as [Fung and Hsieh(1997)], [Fung and Hsieh(1999)]),
and[Aragon and Nanda(2012)].
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growth and ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the correlation coeﬃcient between the hedge fund
and the return on the market portfolio given by (1).9 The parameters ξ ≡ ρσ
and ǫ ≡
√
1− ρ2σ are respectively the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of
the hedge fund. Similar to [Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)], we define
α ≡ µ− r − β(µM − r) ≡ µ− r − ρ σσM (µM − r) ≡ µ− r − ρση as the premium
return on ESFs, i.e. the managers’ skills in CAPM context.10
The Brownian motions B and Z provide the sources of market risk (system-
atic) and idiosyncratic risk of the hedge fund, respectively. A higher absolute
value |ρ| of the correlation coeﬃcient implies that the systematic volatility has
a larger weight, ceteris paribus.
2.2 Seeding innovation with fees-for-seed swap
Since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a tremendous
shortage of capital available to ESFs. Investors have learnt their lessons from the
financial crisis and become smarter and more cautious about their investments.
This has tightened the financing constraints of hedge fund managers even fur-
ther. According to the Seward & Kissel New Hedge Fund Study (2014), 65%
of funds within the Study obtained some form of founders capital (significantly
higher than the 43% in the 2013 study). Moreover, based on conversations with
various industry participants, the study estimates, that within the entire hedge
fund industry for the calendar year 2014, at least 40% of all launches greater
than $75 million (and an estimated 15% of all fund launches) had some form of
seed capital.
In order to attract suﬃcient capital to cover organizational expenses and
be considered credible, hedge fund managers may seek a strategic partner or
a seeder who provides a critical amount of seed capital φS0 in exchange for
economic participation in the funds revenue, i.e. a proportion ψ of the manager’s
fees including both management fee and performance fees in the seeding stage.
2.3 Waterfall schedule upon the expiration of seed invest-
ments
At the end of the lock-up period at time T , AUM ST will be divided among the
ordinary investors, the seeder, and the manager according to a so-called “wa-
terfall” schedule, similar as in [Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014)]. More specif-
ically, let y denote the hurdle rate during the lock-up period for the ordinary
9Unlike the standard literature which uses a HWM incentive structure throughout the
whole lifetime of the fund, our model assumes a two-to-twenty rule under which the ESFs
manager obtains incentive fees at the end of the lock-up period through a waterfall schedule
only, and then for the remaining lifetime of the fund obtains incentive fees through a HWM
rule.
10According to Hedge Fund Research (HFR) the 10-year period between 1994 and 2004
saw funds with less than a three-year track record outperform older funds by over 5% an-
nually, with nearly identical volatility. Other studies, [Aiken, Cliﬀord and Ellis (2013)] and
[Aggarwal and Jorion(2010)] made a number of adjustments to raw performance data to mit-
igate survivorship or backfill biases.
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investors, whose maximum payment at maturity T in consequence is:
Z0 = (1− φ)S0eyT . (3)
Any remaining proceeds after deducting the ordinary investors’ share, Z0, and
returning the seed capital with preferred hurdle rate h, i.e. φS0e
hT , constitute
the profits of the ESFs, given by:
ST − Z1, (4)
where Z1 ≡ Z0 + φS0ehT is the upper boundary that equals to the sum of
the maximum payment to the ordinary investors and the preferred return for
the seeder. These profits are divided between the ordinary investors and the
ESFs manager. The manager receives her carried interest, while the ordinary
investor’s share along with his maximum payments remain in AUM after the
seeding stage. Therefore, there are three regions of the waterfall structure,
depending on the amount of AUM at the end of the lock-up period.
Region 1: Hurdle rate for the ordinary investors (ST ≤ Z0) In our
model, the ordinary investors’ payoﬀs is senior to the seeder’s investment, thus
the seeder and the manager receive nothing if ST falls below the boundary of
Z0. The guaranteed payment to the ordinary investors is given by:
OP1(AT , T ) = min{ST , Z0}. (5)
Region 2: Preferred return (Z0 ≤ ST ≤ Z1) At the upper boundary of
this region, the seeder gets her seed capital back with a prescribed hurdle rate
h, φS0e
hT , and the seeder’s payoﬀ in this region, at maturity T , is:
SP (ST , T ) = max{ST − Z0, 0} −max{ST − Z1, 0}. (6)
Region 3: The ESFs manager’s carried interest (ST > Z1) After de-
ducting the guaranteed payment and preferred return of the seed capital, the
ESFs manager claims her carried interest, the fraction k of the profits ST −Z1,
given by:
GP (ST , T ) = k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}. (7)
Denote OP3(ST , T ) as the ordinary investors’ share in this region which is given
by:
OP3(ST , T ) = (1− k) ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}. (8)
One can easily compute the sum of the payoﬀs of all agents, at maturity T ,
which satisfies:
OP1(AT , T ) +OP3(ST , T ) + SP (ST , T ) +GP (ST , T ) = ST . (9)
After returning the seed capital, only the ordinary investors’ payoﬀ remains
in the fund, and the adjusted AUM S∗T is:
S∗T ≡ OP (AT , T ) = OP1(AT , T ) +OP3(ST , T ). (10)
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Therefore, the ordinary investors’ claim at maturity T , denoted by OP ∗(AT , T ),
satisfies:
OP ∗(AT , T ) = I(S∗T , S
∗
T ), (11)
where I(S∗T , S
∗
T ), the investors’ claim in the Goetzmann-Ingersoll-Ross model, is
determined by (A.11) in Appendix A. Appendix A presents more details about
the market value of the ordinary investors’ claim after the seeding stage.
2.4 The manager’s problem
The ESFs manager’s standard time separable preference is characterized by her
initial wealth W0 and a pure subjective discount rate δ, and her utility function
U(C), represented by:
max
cs
E
[∫ ∞
0
exp (−δs)U(cs)ds
]
. (12)
For tractability, we assume the manager has constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility preference, given by
U(c) = − exp(−γc)/γ, (13)
where γ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. The overall time horizon
[0,∞) entails the lock-up period [0, T ] during which the manager faces idiosyn-
cratic risk (possibly due to assets in the fund being less liquid and proprietary) as
well as the remaining period [T,∞), during which it is assumed that the underly-
ing risks are fully spanned by public assets, as in [Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014)]
section 3.11
2.5 Manager’s liquid wealth dynamics
During the lock-up period, the manager’s financial wealth evolves according to,
dWt = (rWt+(1−ψ)mS− ct)dt+Πt((µM − r)dt+σMdBt), 0 < t < T. (14)
The first term in Equation (14) is the wealth accumulation when the manager
fully invests in the risk free asset, plus the revenue of managing the ESFs net
of her consumption. The second term is the excess return from the manager’s
investment in the market portfolio.
At the end of the lock-up period T , the manager’s wealth (including current
portfolio wealth and futures management fees) jumps from WT− to WT , with
WT = WT− +G(ST , T )
= WT− + (1− ψ)[k ∗GP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )].
(15)
11This is an idealization of the fact that idiosyncratic risks in the start up of the fund
and in particular during the lock-up period are significantly higher than when the fund has
established itself.
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The second term on the right hand side of Equation (15) represents the car-
ried interest of the hedge fund seeding business. The term F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) con-
sists of the market value of future fees paid to the manager after the lock-
up period. Per assumption, the risk to which the fund is exposed after the
lock-up period is fully spanned by public assets, as such the market value of
the fees can be computed under the appropriate risk neutral measure as in
[Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)]. An explicit expression for F (S∗T , S
∗
T )
is provided in Equation (A.12) in Appendix A. The dynamic programming prin-
ciple and the fact that we have full spanning over the period [T,∞) implies that
the solution of problem (12) can now been obtained from the solution of the
corresponding problem starting at time T with wealth dynamics
dWt = (rWt +Πt(µM − r) − ct)dt+ΠtσMdBt, (16)
and initial wealth WT according to (15), and then by backward induction over
the interval [0, T ] as in the following section.
3 Model Solution
In this section, we first derive seed costs with fees-for-seed swaps for the ESFs
manager and the breakeven alpha for the ordinary investors. Then we analyze
the manager’s consumption and portfolio choice in a dynamic valuation model
taking account of illiquidity, ESFs managers’ value-adding skills (alpha), incen-
tive compensation, and the fees-for-seed swap. However, the idiosyncratic risk
which is present in the hedge funds seeding business invalidates the standard
two-step complete-markets (Arrow-Debreu) analysis (first value maximization
and then optimal consumption allocation)12 due to the non-separability between
value maximization and consumption smoothing. In order to derive the solution,
we first solve the standard Merton consumption and portfolio choice problem
faced by the manager after the expiration of the lock-up period, similar as in
[Merton(1971)] and [Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)]. Following this, we
solve an optimal control problem maximizing the ESFs manager’s utility during
the seeding stage.
3.1 Market value of total fees and call options on the seed-
ing investment
We assume that the market prices cash-flows attached to liquid assets by using
a risk neutral measure Q equivalent to the measure P when restricted to all
Ft for any t ≥ 0.13 The corresponding state-price deflator π satisfies dπ =
−rπdt − ηπdZ, π0 = 1 and restricted to (Ω,Ft), we have λt = dQdP
∣∣∣
Ft
and
λt = exp(rt)
pit
pi0
, see [Duﬃe(2001)].
12See more details in [Cox and Huang (1989)]
13Such a measure may not be unique due to incompleteness, but we assume here that the
market has chosen a risk neutral measure, which in consequence becomes the market measure.
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Denote by ν ≡ µ − ω − m − ρση ≡ α + r − ω − m the risk-adjusted drift
rate of AUM, and BQt a standard Brownian motion satisfying dB
Q
t = dBt+ηdt.
Then under Q, the dynamics of AUM in (2) can be rewritten as
dSt = νStdt+ ρσStdB
Q
t + ǫStdZt. (17)
Let G∗(St, t) be the market value of the claim underlying St with a payment
flow mSs for s ∈ [t, T ] and a terminal payoﬀ G∗(ST , T ) ≡ k ∗max{ST −Z1, 0}+
F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) . According to the dynamic asset pricing theory ([Duﬃe(2001)]), it
can be written as a conditional expectation under the risk-adjusted measure Q:
G∗(St, t) = E
Q
t
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)mSsds+ e−r(T−t)G∗(ST , T )
]
. (18)
By using Ito’s formula, G∗(St, t) satisfies the follow PDE:
rG∗(St, t) = mS +G∗t + νStG
∗
S(St, t) +
1
2
σ2S2t V G
∗
SS(St, t), (19)
with two boundary conditions
G∗(0, t) = 0,
G∗(ST , T ) = k ∗max{ST − Z1, 0}+ F (S∗T , S∗T ),
(20)
where F (S∗T , S
∗
T ) is the market value of total fees generated after the lock-up
period expires at time T , given by (A.12) in the Appendix A.
Similar to [Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014)], the value at time t of a plain-
vanilla European call option with strike price K and terminal payoﬀ max{ST −
K, 0} at T , denoted by Call (St, t, α,K), is given by:
Call (St, t, α,K) = E
Q
t
[
e−r(T−t)max{ST −K, 0}
]
,
= e(α−ω−m)(T−t)EQt
[
e−ν(T−t)max{ST −K, 0}
]
,
= e(α−ω−m)(T−t)
[
StN(d1)−Ke−ν(T−t)N(d2)
]
,
= Ste
(α−ω−m)(T−t)N(d1)−Ke−r(T−t)N(d2),
(21)
where
d1 = d2 + σ
√
T − t,
d2 =
ln(St/K)+(ν−σ2/2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t .
(22)
The pricing formula here is diﬀerent from the classic Black-Scholes formula as we
assume that the investment of the hedge fund seeding business could generate
excess alpha.
3.2 Seed costs with fees-for-seed swaps
Under the arrangement of a fees-for-seed swap during the hedge fund seeding
stage, the ESFs manager must give up a portion (ψ) of her fees in exchange for
the seed capital (φS0). The cost ψ of the seed capital with fees-for-seed swap,
10
is determined endogenously within the model, in such a way that the value of
the contract is zero at initiation.
Generally speaking, a seeder is usually a diversified investor who signs such
contracts with a large number of ESFs and therefore the idiosyncratic risk of
the hedge fund seeding business is well-diversified.14 Thus, the seed capital
provided by the seeder must be equal to the market value (equilibrium value)
of the fees allocated to the seeder when the contract commences. That is
φS0 = ψG
∗(S0, 0),
ψ = φS0G∗(S0,0) .
(23)
In addition to revenue sharing, seeding investments will be returned to seed-
ers more or less by SP (ST , T ) depending on the performance of the fund at
the end of the lock-up period. Using the pricing formula defined in the last
subsection, one can derive an explicit expression for SP (St, t), the time t value
of this claim, that is
SP (St, t) = Call (St, t, α, Z0)− Call (St, t, α, Z1). (24)
Therefore, the time t value of the seeders’ claim, denoted by SP ∗(St, t), is
given by:
SP ∗(St, t) = SP (St, t) + ψ ∗G∗(St, t). (25)
3.3 Break-even alpha
In Section 2, we considered the terminal payoﬀs (OP ∗(ST , T )) for the ordinary
investors at maturity T . Its present value, denoted by I∗(St, t), satisfies:
I∗(St, t) = E
Q
t
[
e−r(T−t)I(S∗T , S
∗
T )
]
. (26)
By using Ito’s formula, we obtain the following PDE:
rI∗(St, t) = ωSt + I∗t + νStI
∗
S(St, t) +
1
2
σ2S2t V I
∗
SS(St, t), (27)
with the following two boundary conditions defined below:
I∗(ST , T ) = I(S∗T , S
∗
T ),
I∗(0, t) = 0. (28)
In order to break-even at the start of the fund, the ordinary investors’ claim
has to be equal to their initial investment, i.e. I∗(S0, 0) = (1 − φ)S0. Partic-
ularly, ordinary investors benefit (suﬀer the loss) from their investment in the
ESFs if I∗(S0, 0) ≥ (≤)(1 − φ)S0 when the contract commences. Using (27) to
solve I∗(S0, 0) = (1 − φ)S0 for α provides the minimum alpha that should be
generated by the ESFs manager for the ordinary investors to break-even when
the contract commences.
14For example, Larch Lane Advisors LLC (“Larch Lane”) , one of the first dedicated
providers of hedge fund seed capital, has seeded 25 hedge funds and continues to be an
active capital provider for the hedge fund industry.
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3.4 Consumption and portfolio choice after the lock-up
period
As indicated in section 2.5, the manager’s investment problem after the lock-
up period has expired at time T is equivalent to the classical Merton problem
studied in [Merton(1971)], where the initial wealthWT consists of realized port-
folio value prior to time T , waterfall schedule payoﬀ at time T and the market
value of future management and performance fees after time T . The optimal
consumption and portfolio rule is therefore given by
c∗(W ) = r
(
W +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)
, (29)
Π∗ =
η
γrσM
, (30)
where W is the liquid wealth level.
The maximum of the expected utility of consumption after the seeding stage
can be computed as
Je(W ) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
W +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
. (31)
3.5 Manager’s decisions and certainty equivalent valua-
tion
Define Js(W,S, t) as the manager’s value function before the the end of the
seeding stage, i.e.
Js(W,S, t) = max
(cs,Πs)
E
[∫ T
t
exp (−δ(s− t))U(cs)ds+ e−δ(T−t)Je(WT )
∣∣∣∣∣Wt =W,St = S
]
,
(32)
where W is the manager’s financial wealth process, and the function Je(·) is
given by (31). In light of section 2.5. the value function Js(W0, S0, 0) coincides
with the value of the problem (12). During the lock-up period, the manager’s
financial wealth evolves according to,
dWt = (rWt +Πt(µM − r) + (1−ψ)mS − ct)dt+ΠtσMdBt, 0 < t < T, (33)
while as previously discussed, at the end of the lock-up period the wealth jumps
to
WT = WT− +G(ST , T )
= WT− + (1− ψ)[k ∗GP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )].
(34)
Compared to the exogenously given fraction of management fees retained by
the seeder in practice, the fraction ψ in our model is endogenously determined
12
by the fees-for-seed swap. In this case, the manager’s value function Js(W,S, t)
satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
δJs(W,S, t) = sup
c≥0,Π
{U(c) + Jst + (rW +Π(µM − r) + (1− ψ)mS − c)JsW
+ 12 (ΠσM )
2JsWW +ΠσMσρSJ
s
WS + µSJ
s
S +
1
2σ
2S2JsSS}.
(35)
The first-order conditions for the optimal consumption and portfolio choice
are:
U ′(c) = JsW (W,S, t), (36)
Π(S, t) =
−JsW
JsWW
(
µM − r
σM 2
)
+
−JsWS
JsWW
ρσS
σM
. (37)
According to the utility indiﬀerence pricing principle, the utility indiﬀerence
price 15 of the management fee owned by the ESFs manager in the seeding
stage, denoted by G(S, t) 16 , satisfies
Js(W,S, t) = Je(W+G(S, t)) = − 1
γr
exp
[
−γr
(
W +G(S, t) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
)]
.
(38)
Substituting (36), (37), and (38) into (35), we obtain the following theorem
immediately: During the seeding stage for t ∈ [0, T ], the optimal consumption
and portfolio rule is given by
c∗(W,S, t) = r
[
W +G(S, t) +
η2
2γr2
+
δ − r
γr2
]
, (39)
Π∗(S, t) =
η
γrσM
− ρσ
σM
SGS(S, t), (40)
where G(S, t) is the utility indiﬀerence price of the fees owned by the manager,
which is the solution of the following partial diﬀerential equation (PDE):
rG(S, t) = (1−ψ)mS +Gt+ νSGS(S, t) + 1
2
σ2S2GSS(S, t)− γr
2
ǫ2S2GS(S, t)
2,
(41)
subject to the following two boundary conditions:
G(ST , T ) = (1− φ)[kGP (ST , T ) + F (S∗T , S∗T )] (42)
G(0, t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (43)
The first boundary condition states that, at maturity T , the ESFs manager
collects her carried interest plus the market fees paid by an outside manager.
The second boundary condition reflects that the value of the manager’s fees
15It is sometimes called certainty equivalent wealth, which is the risk-adjusted subjective
value of managing the hedge fund seeding business.
16Thanks to the exponential utility assumption, the utility indiﬀerence price is independent
of the wealth level of the fund manager.
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falls down to zero as the underlying AUM converges to zero during the lock-up
period.
Equations (39) and (40) indicate that the hedge fund manager will consume
the implied value G(S, t) and use the market portfolio to dynamically hedge
the hedge fund seeding business risk. More specifically, equation (39) indicates
that the manager’s consumption is equal to the annuity value of the sum of
financial wealth W and the implicit value of the hedge fund seeding business
G(S, t) plus two constant terms which appear in the classical Merton rule, see
[Merton(1971)]. The portfolio-choice rule is given by equation (40) in which
the second term represents the manager’s hedging demand in the context of
her hedge fund seeding business. Equation (41) implies that if the absolute
risk-aversion index equals zero (i.e. the ESFs manager is risk-neutral towards
the idiosyncratic risk), equation (41) becomes the standard equilibrium pricing
equation. Therefore, the last term on the right side of equation (41) captures the
idiosyncratic risk eﬀect on the managers valuation of the hedge fund business.
4 Breakeven Alphas and Seed Costs
We have derived the solution of the fees-for-seed swap portion ψ referred to as
the seed cost and the subjective value of the ESFs manager’s compensation in
Section 3 In this section we provide some numerical results in order to develop
more economic intuition. Baseline breakeven parameters are chosen according to
[Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014)]. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values
used in our baseline breakeven case.
4.1 Breakeven alphas, compensation contracts, and seed
capital involvement
How important is the managerial ability of producing superior performance (al-
pha)? In order to develop more economic intuition, Table 2 presents breakeven
alphas in diﬀerent compensation contracts for various levels of seed capitals.
We first consider the case without any fees, m = k = 0%. No positive alpha is
then required by the ordinary investors for the case of no seed capitals. Inter-
estingly, the ordinary investors can even bear some loss if the fund gets some
seed capitals. For example, the ordinary investors’ investments breakeven for a
negative alpha, α = −0.77%, in the case that the seeder provides 15% of AUM
seed capital as the anchor investor, which means the ordinary investors are more
willing to invest in the fund by following the seeders.
Moreover, some typical compensation contracts are compared in Table 2.
Naturally, increasing either m or k increases the breakeven alpha, for a given
level of seed investments. More specifically, holding the seed capital ratio fixed,
increasing the management fee rate m by 0.5 percentage-points results in an
increase of the breakeven alpha by the same amount. However, increasing k
by 10 % increases the breakeven alpha by 0.55% to 0.75%, depending on seed
capital ratio.
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Table 1: Summary of key parameters in baseline breakeven case
Parameter Symbol Value
Risk-free rate r 5%
Expected return of market portfolio µM 11%
Expected return of the ESFs µ
Volatility of market portfolio σM 20%
Volatility of the ESFs σ 25%
Market Sharpe ratio η 30%
Guaranteed yield y 5%
Hurdle rate h 8%
Management fee m 2%
Incentive fee k 20%
Lock-up period T 2
Managerial skills α
Subjective discount rate δ 5%
Idiosyncratic risk ǫ 23%
Seed capital ratio φ 5%
Correlation coeﬃcient ρ 40%
Exogenous liquidation barrier l 50%
Withdrawal rate, the liquidation parameter ω + λ 5%
Coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion γ 2
Table 2 provides evidence that an ESFs manager would easily reach the
target AUM level to launch a fund via a seeding vehicle as the ordinary investors
benefit from the scheme. However, the ESFs manager backed up with seed
capital has to give certain fraction (ψ) of her fees revenues as compensation to
the seeder, and we will analyze these seed costs in the following subsection.
4.2 The seeder’s value and seed costs
We refer to the last section for the seeder’s value given by Equation (25). Not
surprisingly, the seeder’s value is significantly aﬀected by the fund’s performance
as the left hand sub-figures in Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate. For example,
the seeder’s value has more than tripled as the fund AUM is doubled (from
S0 = 100 to 200). On the other hand, the right subfigure in Figure 1 shows
that the seeder’s value is almost insensitive to time t, given AUM fixed at 100.
The seeder’s value changes only with time t near the maturity and AUM staying
around Z0 and Z1. This is mainly because the seeder’s positions in these options
are in the money when AUM goes to the interval around Z0 and Z1.
Unlike an ad-hoc ”rule of thumb” decision on the fees-for-seed ratio which
is often common in practice, our paper provides a closed-form solution for the
seed cost ψ which is informed by a number of factors such as the amount of the
seed capital, the manager’s alpha, the risk of the fund, etc. and takes account
some key principles from Finance theory. Interestingly, the right hand subfigure
15
Table 2: The table gives breakeven alphas for diﬀerent levels of seed capital ratio,
φ, incentive fees k and management fees, m. Other parameters are β = 0.5,
h = 8%, T = 2 years, and S0 = 100.
m k φ = 0 φ = 5% φ = 10% φ = 15%
0.0% 0% 0.00% -0.24% -0.50% -0.77%
1.5% 10% 2.14% 1.89% 1.62% 1.35%
1.5% 20% 2.79% 2.50% 2.22% 1.93%
1.5% 30% 3.54% 3.16% 2.83% 2.51%
2.0% 10% 2.65% 2.39% 2.12% 1.85%
2.0%a 20% 3.29% 3.00% 2.72% 2.43%
2.0% 30% 4.03% 3.66% 3.33% 3.01%
2.5% 10% 3.15% 2.89% 2.62% 2.35%
2.5% 20% 3.78% 3.50% 3.21% 2.93%
2.5% 30% 4.54% 4.16% 3.83% 3.51%
a Indicates the baseline breakeven case.
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Figure 1: The figure provides comparative statics for the seeder’s payoﬀs with
respect to time t and AUM S for diﬀerent levels of seed capital.
in Figure 2 shows that the fees-for-seed ratio ψ is indeed a linearly increasing
function of the seed capital which could be interpreted as a rule of thumb in
practice. However note that the slope of the function varies with parameters
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Figure 2: The figure presents comparative statics for the seeder’s value with
respect to T t and S, and seed costs ψ with respect to seed capital ratio for
three diﬀerent levels of alpha.
such as the managerial skills. In details, the seeder demands more fund revenue
share for a manager with negative alpha (-1%) than that for a more talented
manager (5%) and the diﬀerence can be up to 40 % if providing 20 % of the
initial AUM (S0).
5 Seeding Investments with Lock-up Period, Sub-
jective Value of Fees, and Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section, we further analyze the eﬀects of the lock-up period, seeding in-
vestment, and idiosyncratic risk on management compensation, illiquidity dis-
count, and the economic value of the fund.
5.1 Lock-up period eﬀects, illiquidity discount and man-
agement compensation
Table 3 presents valuations for the ordinary investors, the seeder, and the ESFs
manager for various levels of alpha. Panel A of Table 3, with a short lock-up
period, shows that the ordinary investors breakeven with α = 3.13%, while
the seeder’s values for various alphas outperform her initial seeding investment
φ ·S0 = 5. This is straightforward because the seeder has an extra option value
in addition to the breakeven swap when the seeding contract commences. As the
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alpha decreases from 5% to -1% the seed cost ψ increases from 9.98% to 19.94
%, which makes sure the seeder breakeven at the beginning of the contract.
Due to the unspanned risk of the seeding business, the ESFs manager bears
the illiquidity costs. Similar to [Wang, Wang and Yang(2012)], the illiquidity
discount for the manager is defined as the diﬀerence of the market value and the
certainty-equivalent value of fees, which is given by ID = G∗(S0, 0)−G(S0, 0).
This discount is the amount the manager would be willing to pay for not bearing
the idiosyncratic risk during the initial seeding stage. As we can see from Table
3, the amount of ID increases by 1.8 to 2.44 as increasing alpha from -1% to
5%.
In Table 3, Panel B, with a relative long lock-up period T = 4 years, shows
the illiquidity discount is much greater than that in Panel A. For the case of
α = 5%, the discount for T = 4 around is six times of that in Panel A. This
means the manager bears more illiquidity discount for longer lock-up periods.
Moreover, the seeder also suﬀers a loss for a long lock-up period. For example,
fixing α = −1%, the seeder suﬀers losses of 1.03 (around 20% of her initial
investment) by extending the lock-up period from 6 months to 4 years.
Table 3: The table presents valuations of diﬀerent agents’ claims with non-
spanned risk for various levels of alpha. The columns refer to: the ordinary
investors’ interest (I∗), the seeders’ payoﬀs (SP ∗), the market value of fees
(G∗), the economic value of the ESFs (V = I∗+SP ∗+G∗), the ESFs manager’s
certain-equivalent valuation (G), the illiquidity discount (ID = G∗ − G), and
the seed costs (ψ). Parameter values are γ = 2, S0 = 100, m = 2%, k = 20%,
φ = 5%, β = 0.5, and h = 8%. Panel A and B report the results for the case
with the lock-up periods T = 0.5 and T = 4, respectively.
α(%) I∗ SP ∗ G∗ V G ID ψ(%)
Panel A: T = 0.5
-1.0 64.53 7.19 20.07 91.79 19.63 0.44 19.94
0.00 69.96 7.25 22.79 100.00 21.19 0.65 17.99
2.00 84.38 7.36 30.19 121.93 29.11 1.08 14.21
3.13 a 95.00 7.42 35.91 138.33 34.42 1.49 12.22
5.00 106.38 7.53 45.09 159.01 42.86 2.24 9.98
Panel B: T = 4
-1.0 64.04 6.16 20.54 90.74 18.43 2.11 19.58
0.00 70.15 6.29 23.56 100.00 20.04 2.30 17.51
2.00 86.36 6.58 31.77 124.71 25.60 6.17 13.60
2.83 a 95.00 6.70 36.31 138.02 28.44 7.87 12.10
5.00 114.48 7.06 49.53 171.06 35.77 13.76 9.17
a Indicates baseline breakeven case.
18
5.2 Seed capitals eﬀects, economic values of the fund
Table 4 presents results of economic values of the fund and subjective values of
fees with or without seeding vehicle (shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively)
for various levels of alpha. More specifically, the economic value of the fund
with seed capital is less (more) than a fund without seed capital for a positive
(negative) alpha, holding alpha fixed. This is because the seed capital will be
returned at a hurdle rate and no longer earns the premium alpha. However, if
we take the illiquidity discount into consideration, the adjusted economic value,
denoted by V ∗ = V − ID, of the fund with seed capital is always greater than
that without seed capital. Take the case alpha = 5% for example, the adjusted
economic value of the ESFs with 5% of seed capital is 156.12, compared to
154.44 for a fund without seed capital. The main reason is that ψ percent of the
ESFs manager revenue is transferred to the outside investors via fees-for-seed
swap, thus generating diversification benefits for the fund.
One may note that the ESFs manager may be better oﬀ without any seeding
investments. This is true only when the ESFs manager can reach the target
AUM level for a successful launch. If it is hard for the manager to achieve the
target, she may turn to the seeder and give up some fraction of her fees revenue
due to lack of bargaining power. For example, Panel B of Table 4 illustrates
that the manager should give up 12.08% of her fees in exchange of 5% of AUM
from the seeder.
For an unskilled ESFs manager, α = 0, both Table 3 and Table 4 show
that the economic value of the fund equals to the initial investment S0 = 100,
which means the ordinary investor bears the loss to pay fees to the manager. As
alpha increases, both the economic value of the fund and the ordinary investors’
payoﬀs grow as we expected.
5.3 Idiosyncratic risk eﬀect, risk aversion and fees
It is obvious that the (subjective) value for the ESFs manager is generally an
increasing function of AUM and time t. Unlike the risk-neutral case, in the
case of risk aversion the subjective values are concave functions of AUM. This
is mainly because of the nonlinear terms in our pricing PDE (41). As shown
in Figure 3, the more risk-averse the manager is, the greater the illiquidity
discount the manager has to bear. More specifically, the illiquidity discount is
very small when AUM stays at a very low level (e.g. below 40), while it increases
quickly and reaches its peak at 33 (for the case γ = 4) as AUM increase to 200.
Moreover, the right hand subfigure in Figure 3 indicates that the gap of the
illiquidity discount between the case γ = 4 and the case γ = 2 converges to
zero as t is approaching the end of the lock-up period T . Once the lock-up
period expires, the ESFs manager is out of the seeding business and bears no
idiosyncratic risk any more.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the eﬀect of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ between the
market and the fund on the subjective value of the management compensation.
Interestingly, the management compensation is a not a monotonous function. It
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Table 4: The table presents valuations of diﬀerent agents’ claims with non-
spanned risk for various levels of alpha. Panel A and B report the results for
the case with φ = 0 and φ = 5%, respectively.
α(%) I∗ SP ∗ G∗ V G ID ψ (%)
Panel A: the seed capital ratio φ = 0
-1.0 65.28 0.00 25.90 91.18 22.46 3.45 0.00
0.00 71.16 0.00 28.84 100.00 24.72 4.11 0.00
2.00 86.76 0.00 36.80 123.56 30.70 6.10 0.00
3.29 a 100.00 0.00 43.95 143.95 35.88 8.08 0.00
5.00 112.09 0.00 53.36 165.45 42.37 10.99 0.00
Panel B: the seed capital ratio φ = 5%
-1.0 64.27 6.53 20.51 91.31 19.08 1.43 19.60
0.00 70.00 6.63 23.37 100.00 20.45 1.60 17.62
2.00 85.17 6.85 31.14 123.15 27.38 3.76 13.84
3.00 a 95.00 6.96 36.39 138.35 31.34 5.05 12.08
5.00 109.73 7.19 47.25 164.16 39.21 8.04 9.57
a Indicates baseline breakeven case.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics for management compensation with respect to
AUM and time t for various levels of risk aversion.
first increases with ρ to its maximum point and then decreases afterward. On
the one hand, managerial skills alpha drops (α = µ− r − ρση)) as ρ increases,
which causes a negative eﬀect on the subjective value G. On the other hand,
the idiosyncratic risk decreases as ρ increases (keeping total fund volatility σ
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correlation coeﬃcients ρ.
unchanged), which is a positive eﬀect on management compensation. There-
fore, the ESFs manager faces a trade oﬀ between the correlation coeﬃcient
and idiosyncratic risk. Particularly, management compensation is an increasing
function as the positive eﬀect of the idiosyncratic risk dominates the negative
eﬀect of diminishing alpha for ρ less than around 20 %. As ρ continues to in-
crease, the negative eﬀect dominates, and the function turns into a decreasing
function.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we developed a dynamic valuation model for the hedge fund
seeding business by solving the consumption and portfolio-choice problem of a
risk-averse manager who launches a hedge fund through a seeding vehicle. As
traditional approaches to attract the initial AUM and covering of organizational
expenses becomes much harder for ESFs managers in a much tighter financial
landscape, nowadays more and more ESFs managers are likely to turn to seed
investors for early stages of capital by oﬀering a certain proportion of their fees
through a seeding vehicle. The new swap specifies that a seeder commonly com-
mits to providing a remarkable amount of seed capital to an ESFs manager as an
“anchor investor” in a new fund in exchange for a share of “enhanced economics”
which is usually a proportion of the fees that the ESFs manager generates from
the entire pool of assets in the fund. Our results indicate that the new swap not
only solves the serious problems of widespread financing constraints for ESFs
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managers, but can also be highly beneficial to both the manager and the seeder
if structured properly.
Moreover, we derived a closed-form solution for the fees-for-seed ratio, i.e.
the seed cost, as well as the manager’s value attached to the hedge fund seeding
business. In addition we presented a detailed numerical analysis in which we
discussed sensitivity eﬀects of various model parameters such as the risk aver-
sion coeﬃcient as well as the skills factor α on our results. Our analysis showed
that, as we would expect, the greater the seed capital obtained, the more fees
the manager should give up. The fees-for-seed ratio is a linear increasing func-
tion of the amount of the seed capital. However, more interestingly, unlike an
uninformed “rule of thumb”, the slope term in this linear relationship depends
on factors such as fund volatility and managerial skills. Therefore, the closed-
form solution of the seed costs in our model is much more informed and can be
regarded as a theoretical guide to the design of a seeding vehicle contract.
Our model assumes the ESFs manager is risk averse towards the hedge fund
seeding business, thus she suﬀers the illiquidity discount for her valuation due
to unspanned idiosyncratic risk. Once the ESFs is out of the seeding stage and
enters into normal stage, the manager bears no idiosyncratic risk. We found
that the more risk-averse the manager is, the greater the illiquidity discount
the manager has to bear, thus the lower her subjective value is. In addition,
the manager bears more idiosyncratic risk for longer duration of the lock-up
period, i.e. the hedge fund seeding stage. Given fixed expected return and
volatility of the fund, the ESFs manager faces a trade oﬀ between the correlation
coeﬃcient and idiosyncratic risk. As the correlation coeﬃcient increases, the
positive eﬀect of decreasing idiosyncratic risk at first dominates the negative
eﬀect of diminishing alpha for low level of ρ, but then is dominated by the
negative eﬀect of diminishing alpha.
More importantly, the ordinary investors are more willing to invest in an
ESFs backed up by seeders via a fees-for-seed swap. As our numerical results
illustrate, the more seed capital the fund gets the smaller breakeven alphas the
ordinary investors demand for their investment. Therefore, the seeding vehicle
helps the ESFs attract more investors and get suﬃcient capital for a successful
launch. Moreover, our results show that the adjusted economic value, denoted
by V ∗ = V −ID, for a fund with seed capital is always greater than that without
any seed capitals due to ψ percent of the ESFs manager revenue is transferred
to the outside investors via fees-for-seed swaps.
There are various ways to extend this research. First, dynamic leverage could
be incorporated into our model to further analyze ESFs managers’ risk shifting
behavior, inspired by [Lan, Wang and Yang(2013)]. Second, we could extend
our model to feature risk aversion among the hedge fund seeding investors to cap-
ture the illiquidity of hedge fund seeding investment, see [Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014)],
[Wang, Wang and Yang(2012)] among others. Finally, it would be worth to cap-
ture the feature of partial information about managerial skills in our model.
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Appendices
Appendix A Market Value of the Hedge Fund
After the lock-up period, we assume that the fund enters into a normal stage
and the manager no longer bears the idiosyncratic risk, which is quite similar
to the case discussed in [Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)]. In the normal
stage, the manager is paid via both management and performance fees. The
management fee is specified as a constant fraction m of the net asset value
while the incentive fee is commonly accompanied by a high water mark (HWM)
provision. Intuitively, the HWM Ht is the running maximum of net asset value
S when g ≡ ω + c′ , i.e. Ht = max{Su;u ∈ [0, t]}. In a more general setting, for
St < Ht, the HWM Ht evolves deterministically as
dHt = (g − ω − c
′
)Htdt, (A.1)
where g is the contractual growth rate at which H changes (generally zero or
r) and c
′
is the cost or fees allocated to reducing the HWM.
At any time t ≥ 0, we can compute the value of the total fees F (S,H, t) and
the ordinary investors’ value I(S,H) respectively as follows:
F (S,H, t) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)[mS + k(dHs − (g − ω − c
′
)Hsds)]ds
]
, (A.2)
I(S,H, t) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)ωS + e−r(s−t)Sτds
]
, (A.3)
where τ , the stochastic liquidation time, is defined as τ = min{τ1, τ2} where τ1
is the exogenous liquidation time and τ2 ≡ inf{t;St/Ht = l} is the endogenous
liquidation time.
Using the same valuation approach as in subsection 3.1, the market values
of the contingent claims defined above satisfy the following ODE17
(α+r−ω−m)SVS+1
2
σ2S2VSS+(g−ω−c
′
)HVH+λV −rV +f(S, t) = 0, (A.4)
where f(S, t) represents any payment made to the claims to be valued for the
two diﬀerent cases, and two boundary conditions apply as stated below.
Further, it is clear that the underlying economics of the problem implies that
V (y) is homogeneous of degree one in S and H , hence the solution has the form
V (S,H) = HQ(x), where x ≡ S/H . Substituting this expression as well as its
derivatives into Equation (A.4) gives an ODE
1
2
σ2x2Qxx + (α+ r+ c
′ − g −m)xQx − (r + c
′ − g + ω + λ)Q+ θx = 0, (A.5)
17Similar to [Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)], the values of the contingent claims are
independent of time in our setup, i.e. Vt ≡ 0
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where θ = m for the case of management fee or total fees, and θ = ω+λ for the
case of payoﬀs allocated to the ordinary investors.
The solution to Equation (A.5) is given by
Q(x) =
γx
m+ ω + λ− α +Ax
ϑ1 +Bxϑ2 , (A.6)
where A and B are constants of integration and the two real roots, denoted by
ϑ1 and ϑ2 solve the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2ϑ(ϑ− 1) + (α+ r + c′ −m− g)ϑ− (r + c′ − g + ω + λ) = 0. (A.7)
Solving the above equation and imposing the no bubble conditions m+ ω+
λ ≥ α 18leads to:
ϑ1,2 =
−(̟ − σ2/2)∓√(̟ − σ2/2)2 + 2σ2(̟ +m− α+ ω + λ)
σ2
, (A.8)
where̟ ≡ α+ r + c′ −m− g obviously ϑ1 < 1 < ϑ2.
In order to solve the ODE, two boundary conditions are required. One
boundary condition is determined as the asset value falls to the liquidation
barrier, x ≡ l:
i(l) ≡ I(lH,H)/H = l,
f(l) ≡ F (lH,H)/H = 0. (A.9)
The other condition applies along the boundary x¯ ≡ 1 when the HWM is
reset to H + ε, while the net asset value exceeds the HWM at the level of H + ε
and then the manager obtains a performance fee of kε, reducing the asset value
to H + ε(1− k). For ε→ 0, we have
i(1) = (k + 1)i′(1),
f(1) = (k + 1)f ′(1)− k. (A.10)
One can identify the solution V (S,H) by specifying the general solution of
the homogeneous ODE with the two boundary conditions defined in equations
(A.9) and (A.10).
Solving the above equation and applying the no bubble conditionsm+ω+λ ≥
α provides us with:
I(S,H) = ω+λm+ω+λ−αS − (ω+λ)k+[ϑ1(1+k)−1](m−α)l
1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ2Sϑ2
+ l
ϑ2−ϑ1(ω+λ)k+[ϑ2(1+k)−1](m−α)l1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ1Sϑ1 ,
(A.11)
F (S,H) = mm+ω+λ−αS +
(ω+λ−α)k+[ϑ1(1+k)−1]ml1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ2Sϑ2
− lϑ2−ϑ1(ω+λ−α)k+[ϑ2(1+k)−1]ml1−ϑ1
(m+ω+λ−α){ϑ2(1+k)−1−lϑ2−ϑ1 [ϑ1(1+k)−1]}H
1−ϑ1Sϑ1 .
(A.12)
18Similar to [Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)] who state that, “the total withdrawals
from the assets, m+ω+λ, must exceed the superior performance, α; otherwise, the fund will
have a residual value at infinity whose present value is infinite.”
24
References
[Agarwal, Daniel and Naik(2009)] Agarwal,V., Daniel, N.D. and Naik, N.Y.,
2009. Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance.
J. Finance 64(5), 2221-2256.
[Agarwal, Daniel and Naik(2011)] Agarwal,V., Daniel, N.D., Naik, N.Y., 2011.
Do hedge funds manage their reported returns? Rev. Financ. Stud. 24(10),
3281-3320.
[Aggarwal and Jorion(2010)] Aggarwal, R.K., Jorion, P., 2010. The perfor-
mance of emerging hedge funds and managers. J. Financ. Econ. 96(2), 238-
256.
[Aiken, Cliﬀord and Ellis (2013)] Aiken, A.L., Cliﬀord, C.P., Ellis, J., 2013. Out
of the dark: hedge fund reporting biases and commercial databases. Rev.
Financ. Stud. 26(1), 208-243.
[Aragon and Nanda(2012)] Aragon, G.O., Nanda, V., 2012. Tournament be-
havior in hedge funds: high-water marks, fund liquidation, and managerial
stake. Rev. Financ. Stud. 25(3), 937-974.
[Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro(2007)] Basak, S., Pavlova, A., Shapiro, A., 2007.
Optimal asset allocation and risk shifting in money management. Rev. Financ.
Stud. 20(5), 1583-621.
[Carpenter(2000)] Carpenter, J., 2000. Does option compensation increase man-
agerial risk appetite? J. Finance 55(5), 2311-2331.
[Chen, Miao and Wang(2010)] Chen, H., Miao, J.J., Wang, N., 2010. En-
trepreneurial finance and non-diversifiable risk. Rev. Financ. Stud. 23(12),
4348-4388.
[Cox and Huang (1989)] Cox, J. C., Huang, C., 1989. Optimum consumption
and portfolio policies when asset prices follow a diﬀusion process. J. Econ.
Theory 49(1), 33-83.
[Duﬃe(2001)] Duﬃe, D., 2001. Dynamic asset pricing theory, 3rd ed. Princeton,
NJ: University Press.
[Fung and Hsieh(1997)] Fung, W., Hsieh, D., 1997. Empirical characteristics of
dynamic trading strategies: the case of hedge funds. Rev. Finanv. Stud. 10(2),
275-302.
[Fung and Hsieh(1999)] Fung, W., Hsieh, D., 1999. A primer on hedge funds.
J. Empirical Finance 6(3), 309-331.
[Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003)] Goetzmann, W.N., Ingersoll, J., Ross,
S.A., 2003. High-water marks and hedge fund management contracts. J. Fi-
nance 58(4), 1685-1717.
25
[Grossman and Zhou(1993)] Grossman, S.J., Zhou, Z., 1993. Optimal invest-
ment strategies for controlling drawdowns. Math. Finance 3(3), 241-276.
[Hodder and Jackwerth (2007)] Hodder, J.E., Jackwerth, J.C., 2007. Incentive
contracts and hedge fund management. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 42(4), 811-
826.
[Ingersoll(2006)] Ingersoll, J.E., 2006. The subjective and objective evaluation
of incentive stock options. J. Bus. 79(2), 453-487.
[Kahl, Liu and Longstaﬀ(2003)] Kahl, M., Liu, J., Longstaﬀ, F.A., 2003. Paper
millionaires: how valuable is stock to a stockholder who is restricted from
selling it? J. Financ. Econ. 67(3), 385-410.
[Lan, Wang and Yang(2013)] Lan, Y., Wang, N., Yang, J.Q., 2013. The eco-
nomics of hedge funds. J. Financ. Econ. 110(2), 300-323.
[Merton(1971)] Merton, R. C., 1971. Optimum consumption and portfolio rules
in a continuous-time model. J. Econ. Theory 3(4), 373-414.
[Merton(1976)] Merton, R. C., 1976. Option pricing when underlying stock re-
turns are discontinuous. J. Financ. Econ. 3(1-2), 125-144.
[Panageas and Westerfield(2009)] Panageas, S., Westerfield, M.M., 2009. High-
water marks: high risk appetite? Convex compensation, long horizons, and
portfolio choice. J. Finance 64(1), 1-36.
[Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014)] Sorensen, M., Wang, N., Yang, J.Q., 2014.
Value private equity. Rev. Financ. Stud. 27(7), 1977-2021.
[Wang, Wang and Yang(2012)] Wang, C., Wang, N., Yang, J.Q., 2012. A uni-
fied model of entrepreneurship dynamics. J. Financ. Econ. 106(1), 1-23.
26
